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 NOTE 
Intent or Opportunity? Eighth Circuit 
Analyzes Intent Element of Generic 
Burglary  
United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2017) 
Rachel Mitchell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) is a federal law that imposes 
mandatory enhanced sentencing for offenders found to have multiple prior con-
victions for violent crimes.1  What constitutes a prior violent offense, however, 
has been the subject of over twenty-five years of litigation.2  The ACCA pro-
vides three paths to punish criminals based on prior violent offenses, one of 
which is an enumerated list of crimes that are statutorily defined by the ACCA 
as “violent felonies.”3  Although burglary is one of the enumerated offenses,4 
Congress failed to specifically define burglary itself for purposes of the 
ACCA.5  As a result, much of the litigation surrounding enhanced sentencing 
under the ACCA has revolved around whether all state burglary statutes count 
as violent felonies, given that there is no common definition.6 
In an attempt to solve this dilemma, the United States Supreme Court de-
veloped elements of “generic burglary” to hone in on what constitutes a prior 
conviction for burglary under the ACCA.7  In Taylor v. United States, the Court 
wrote that generic burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or re-
maining in, a building or other structure, with [the] intent to commit a crime.”8  
The elements of generic burglary, however, have themselves been the subject 
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 1. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2018). 
 2. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Taylor v. United 
States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1989), 
abrogated by Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 580. 
 6. See, e.g., id. 
 7. Id. at 598. 
 8. Id. 
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of intensive litigation, resulting in multiple circuit splits on various aspects of 
the elements.9  One element that has recently divided the circuit courts is 
whether the intent element of generic burglary is required to form at a particular 
time relative to an unlawful entry or remaining in a building or structure.10 
This Note examines the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. McArthur, which held that intent is required to form 
at the moment of unlawful entry or remaining in for the purposes of enhanced 
sentencing under the ACCA.11  Part II lays out the facts and holding of the 
McArthur decision.  Part III discusses the legal background relevant to the 
McArthur decision.  The legal background includes an overview of the relevant 
portions of the ACCA, several United States Supreme Court decisions inter-
preting the ACCA, and the case law from the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, which created the split.  Part IV details the 
unanimous McArthur opinion.  Part V argues that McArthur is the superior 
opinion in the circuit split and the one that the United States Supreme Court 
should adopt when it resolves the issue.  In the alternative, this Note makes the 
case that the ACCA is vague and should be ruled unconstitutional.  Part VI 
concludes the Note. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
William Earl Morris is a member of Native Mob, a Minnesota prison and 
street gang.12  Morris and two other gang members, Wakinyan McArthur and 
Anthony Cree, jointly stood trial in 2013 for a multitude of crimes related to 
their involvement with Native Mob.13  In early 2010, mob members determined 
that a former associate, Amos LaDuke, “needed to be wacked” and gave Morris 
a gun in case he came across LaDuke.14  On March 4, 2010, Cree, Morris, and 
two other gang associates went to Cass Lake, Minnesota.15  Upon finding 
 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2017); United 
States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 10. Compare McArthur, 850 F.3d at 939 (finding that intent must form prior to or 
at the same time as unlawful entry or remaining in), with Bonilla, 687 F.3d at 193 (find-
ing that contemporaneous intent is not required). 
 11. 850 F.3d 925, 939.  Since McArthur was decided, the Eighth Circuit has also 
determined that several other state burglary statutes did not qualify for enhanced sen-
tencing under the ACCA.  See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 854 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th 
Cir. 2017) (finding that Arkansas’s residential burglary statue if broader than generic 
burglary), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018); 
United States v. Kinney, 888 F.3d 360, 364 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding that North Dakota’s 
burglary statute is broader than the elements of generic burglary). 
 12. McArthur, 850 F.3d at 931. 
 13. Id.  McArthur and Cree were tried and convicted in the same trial and also 
appealed jointly with Morris.  Id.  Those crimes and appeals, however, are not the sub-
ject of this Note and thus will not be discussed. 
 14. Id. at 931–32. 
 15. Id. at 932. 
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LaDuke walking there, Morris exited the vehicle with his firearm.16  LaDuke 
saw Morris and tried to run from him.17  In response, Morris fired multiple 
rounds, hitting LaDuke three times.18  The attack stopped when an ex-police 
officer drove his truck in-between the two men.19  At that point, Morris aban-
doned the scene.20  Authorities quickly found and arrested Morris.21 
Morris was charged in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minne-
sota with six federal felonies: (1) conspiracy to participate in racketeering; (2) 
conspiracy to carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; (3) 
attempted murder in relation to racketeering; (4) assault with a dangerous 
weapon in aid of racketeering; (5) carrying and using a firearm during a crime 
of violence; and (6) felon in possession of a firearm.22  After six weeks at trial, 
the jury acquitted Morris of counts one and two and convicted him of counts 
three through six.23 
At sentencing, the trial judge found, over Morris’ objection, that Morris’ 
three prior convictions for third-degree burglary24 under Minnesota state law 
constituted “violent felonies” for purposes of enhanced sentencing under § 
924(e)25 of the ACCA.26  This finding meant that Morris faced a mandatory 
minimum sentence of fifteen years to life in prison for his conviction as a felon 
in possession of a firearm.27  The judge sentenced Morris to thirty years in 
prison on that count alone, and he was sentenced for a total of thirty-five years 
for all of his convictions combined.28 
On appeal, Morris alleged that the trial court erred when it found that his 
prior burglary convictions were sufficient to subject him to enhanced sentenc-
ing under the ACCA.29  Morris argued that the Minnesota statute’s elements 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 933. 
 23. Special Verdict Form at 1–5, McArthur, 850 F.3d 925 (No. 12-26 (6)). 
 24. The record does not provide any factual information related to how Morris 
committed the prior burglaries.  The fact that the trial court did not attempt to assess 
whether the elements of Morris’ third-degree burglaries met the definition of generic 
burglary for the purposes of the ACCA is a point of contention in Morris’ appellant 
brief.  See Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 33–36, McArthur, 850 F.3d 925 (No. 
14-3336). 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2018). 
 26. McArthur, 850 F.3d at 933. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 937.  Morris also made two other arguments on appeal: (1) that there was 
insufficient evidence against him to uphold the attempted murder and assault convic-
tions and (2) that the jury instructions had constructively amended the indictment.  Id. 
at 936.  The Eighth Circuit did not find these claims meritorious.  Id. at 936–37.  Be-
cause these claims are not the focus of this Note, they will not be examined further. 
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for burglary were indivisible under Mathis v. United States30 and broader than 
the elements the Court had established for “generic burglary” in Taylor v. 
United States.31 Therefore, Morris argued his prior convictions were not “vio-
lent felonies” for the purposes of the ACCA.32  The government agreed that 
the statute was indivisible but still contended that Minnesota’s statute consti-
tuted a “violent felony.”33 
The Eighth Circuit agreed with Morris and held that Morris’ prior bur-
glary convictions were not “violent felonies” within the meaning of the ACCA 
because the Minnesota burglary statute at issue has a broader definition of bur-
glary than does Taylor.34  As a result, Morris’ sentence was vacated and re-
manded for resentencing.35 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The analysis in the Eighth Circuit’s decision involved two primary ques-
tions.36  First, are the alternative phrasings in Minnesota’s burglary statute el-
ements of different crimes, or are they factual means of satisfying a single ele-
ment of a single crime?37  Second, does “generic burglary” under Taylor re-
quire that the element of intent to commit a crime exist at the moment of un-
lawful entry into a building, or may it evolve at any point during the unlawful 
occupation of the building in order to be a “violent felony” under the ACCA?38  
This Part begins by examining relevant portions of the ACCA and analyzing 
the way the United States Supreme Court has defined burglary.  Then, this Part 
looks at how the other circuits have answered the intent question. 
A. The Requirements of the Armed Career Criminal Act and the 
Court’s Definition of Burglary 
The ACCA was enacted under the Reagan Administration as part of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.39  The ACCA made it a crime for 
any person who had been “convicted in any court of [] a crime punishable by 
 
 30. 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
 31. 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
 32. McArthur, 850 F.3d at 937. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 940. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. at 937–39. 
 37. Id. at 937. 
 38. Id. at 938–39. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1801–03, 98 Stat. 1837, 2185 (1984). 
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imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”40 to possess a firearm.41  A vio-
lation of this law imposed a mandatory maximum sentence of ten years.42  Fur-
thermore, a person who violated the law and who had three or more convictions 
for “violent felonies” would receive an enhanced minimum sentence of fifteen 
years to life in prison.43  As originally passed, punishment for the enhanced 
violation also precluded the offender from obtaining parole.44  In 1994, Con-
gress amended the law to allow offenders sentenced under § 924(e) to be con-
sidered for parole.45  One of the ways that Congress defined a “violent felony” 
was as a crime that is both punishable for more than one year in prison and is 
a burglary.46  This language in the ACCA soon proved problematic because 
burglary has no “single accepted meaning” and “the criminal codes of the 
[s]tates define burglary in many different ways.”47  The United States Supreme 
Court attempted to remedy this problem in Taylor. 
In Taylor, the defendant pleaded guilty to a felon in possession of a 
weapon charge, and the trial court sentenced him in accordance with the en-
hancement violation under the ACCA because he had four prior convictions, 
including robbery, assault,48 and two second-degree burglaries under Missouri 
law.49  The defendant appealed and claimed that his burglaries could not be 
counted on the basis that they had not posed a risk to another person.50  The 
defendant argued that Missouri law distinguishes violent burglary from nonvi-
olent burglary because it sets out the crimes in varying degrees.51  Taylor was 
 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). 
 41. Id. § 922(g). 
 42. Id. § 924(a)(2). 
 43. Id. § 924(e)(1). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 110510(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2018 (1994). 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
 47. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 580 (1990); see also, e.g., MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 569.170.1 (2016) (defining burglary as knowingly entering or unlawfully re-
maining in a building for the purpose of committing a crime); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 266, § 14 (West 2018) (defining burglary as breaking and entering a dwelling at 
night with the intent to commit a crime); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-402(a) (West 
2018) (defining burglary four different ways, including entering a building without con-
sent and then committing a felony, theft, or assault); CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 
2018) (describing burglary as entering a variety of places, some of which are any house, 
shop, mill, barn, vessel, floating home, or mine, with the intent to commit a grand or 
petit larceny or a felony). 
 48. The assault conviction could not be verified and therefore was not used by the 
trial judge in considering if Taylor qualified for enhanced sentencing under the ACCA.  
See Brief for the Petitioner at *4, Taylor, 495 U.S. 575 (No. 88-7194). 
 49. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578. 
 50. Id. at 579. 
 51. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 48, at *7–8. 
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convicted under second-degree burglary, which referenced unarmed burglary 
in an unoccupied building.52 
The Court examined the legislative history of the ACCA and found that 
Congress likely intended burglary to have a modern definition that matched the 
same basic elements found in a majority of the states, regardless of what the 
crime was labeled.53  The Court relied on the Model Penal Code and LaFave 
& Scott’s Substantive Criminal Law treatise to determine the common ele-
ments of burglary are “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in,  
a building or other structure with intent to commit a crime.”54  The Court also 
held that when a sentencing court is looking at prior crimes to determine if they 
meet the “generic burglary” elements, the sentencing court need only consider 
the statutory definitions of the offenses and not the particular facts of the prior 
crimes.55  Finally, the Court held, for purposes of the ACCA, the elements of 
a state statute had to be the same as or narrower than what the Court defined as 
“generic burglary” or the jury instructions had to show that they had to find 
those elements.56 
The Taylor Court was silent about how to treat a state statute that provided 
alternative versions of the crime.  In Descamps v. United States, the Court sum-
marized its precedents since Taylor regarding the divisibility of statutes that 
provided for alternative ways to commit burglary.57  The Court stated that when 
a statute gives multiple, divisible alternatives of a crime and not all alternatives 
qualify under the ACCA as “violent felonies,” the sentencing court can, when 
it is unclear which alternative the defendant was convicted of or pleaded to, 
view certain other documents, such as a plea agreement, to determine if the 
elements the defendant was convicted on were those of generic burglary.58 
In a subsequent case, Mathis v. United States, the Court revisited the al-
ternatives question because it was unclear in that case whether the Iowa statute 
that presented alternatives was actually divisible.59  The Iowa burglary statute 
at issue included the element of “unlawful entry” but then went on to list mul-
tiple places where an unlawful entry could occur to satisfy the element: in a 
building, in a structure, on land, in water, or in an air vehicle.60  The jury could 
convict the defendant as long as it agreed that the unlawful entry occurred at 
one of these locations; the jurors did not have to agree on the actual location of 
the unlawful entry.61  The Court found that Iowa’s statute was indivisible be-
cause its alternatives were “various factual means of committing a single ele-
ment,” unlike the previous cases that dealt with statutes whose alternatives 
 
 52. Id. at *8. 
 53. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581–92. 
 54. Id. at 598. 
 55. Id. at 600–01; see also discussion infra in Part V. 
 56. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
 57. 570 U.S. 254, 262–64 (2013). 
 58. Id. 
 59. 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). 
 60. Id. at 2250. 
 61. Id. 
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were actually “multiple elements [listed] disjunctively”62 that created separate 
crimes.63  Iowa’s statute, therefore, was not burglary under the ACCA because 
its unlawful entry element, which contained vehicles, was broader than generic 
burglary, which only allows for buildings and structures.64 
B. The Circuits Are Split on When Intent Must Be Formed to Qualify 
as Generic Burglary 
The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have 
all heard challenges to ACCA-enhanced sentences over the intent requirement 
in generic burglary.65  Taylor only noted that generic burglary was unlawful 
entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure “with the intent to commit a 
crime.”66  Taylor did not specify when intent must be formed relative to un-
lawful entry.67  In 2007, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the intent element as re-
quired to exist before or at the time of unlawful entry.68  The court explained 
as an example that “teenagers who unlawfully enter a house only to party, and 
only later decide to commit a crime, are not common burglars.”69  In 2016, 
United States v. Bernel-Aveja posed the same question and the Fifth Circuit 
reaffirmed its earlier holding by finding that the Ohio statute at issue was not 
generic burglary because it allowed intent to commit a crime to form after the 
unlawful entry had occurred.70 
In contrast, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have come to the opposite con-
clusion.71  In United States v. Bonilla, the Fourth Circuit found that the defend-
ant had “necessarily developed the intent” by unlawfully remaining in a build-
ing and then committing a crime.72  The court thought that reading Taylor to 
require intent at the moment of unlawful entry was too rigid.73  The Sixth Cir-
cuit likewise agreed that intent necessarily formed whenever a criminal com-
mitted a felony while “remaining in” a building unlawfully.74  Because the 
 
 62. Id. at 2249. 
 63. Id. at 2250. 
 64. Id. at 2250–51. 
 65. See United States v. Bernel-Aveja, 844 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2016); United States 
v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. 2015), abrogated by United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 
854 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc); United States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Herrera-Montes, 490 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 66. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). 
 67. See id. 
 68. Herrera-Montes, 490 F.3d at 392. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Bernel-Aveja, 844 F.3d at 214. 
 71. See United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. 2015), abrogated by United 
States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc); United States v. Bonilla, 687 
F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 72. Bonilla, 687 F.3d at 193–94. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Priddy, 808 F.3d at 684–85. 
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United States Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the split over the for-
mation of intent, the Eighth Circuit chose its side in United States v. McAr-
thur.75 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Eighth Circuit held that Morris’ prior burglary con-
victions could not support an enhanced conviction under the ACCA because 
generic burglary requires intent to commit a crime to form prior to or at the 
same time as an unlawful entry into a building or structure.76  To reach this 
determination, the court had to first decide if the Minnesota burglary statute at 
issue was divisible or indivisible because it offered alternatives for convic-
tion.77  Then the court had to determine if generic burglary under Taylor en-
compassed burglary crimes where intent formed at any time in relation to un-
lawful entry or if intent was required to form at a specific moment.78 
The Minnesota statute provides, “Whoever enters a building without con-
sent and with intent to steal or commit any felony or gross misdemeanor while 
in the building, or enters a building without consent and steals or commits a 
felony or gross misdemeanor while in the building, either directly or as an ac-
complice, commits burglary . . . .”79  The Eighth Circuit found that under 
Mathis it was required to decide “whether the listed alternatives are elements 
of different crimes or factual means of satisfying a single element of a single 
crime.”80  To do this, the Eighth Circuit examined a case decided by the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals, which it described as “the most helpful Minnesota 
court decision” to interpret the statute.81  In State v. Gonzales, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals described the burglary statute as allowing juries to convict if 
the alternative acts “occurred at the same place, involved the same victim, and 
took place over a short period of time” without coming to a unanimous decision 
about the particular acts themselves.82  The Eighth Circuit also looked at the 
charging documents from Morris’ burglary cases and found that they alleged 
both alternatives.83  Taken together, the Eighth Circuit found that the evidence 
supported an interpretation that the Minnesota statute’s alternative language 
did not create two separate crimes but rather offered different acts that could 
 
 75. See 850 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 76. Id. at 940. 
 77. Id. at 937–38; see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.582(3) (West 2018). 
 78. McArthur, 850 F.3d at 939. 
 79. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.582(3). 
 80. McArthur, 850 F.3d at 938. 
 81. Id. 
 82. No. A15-0975, 2016 WL 3222795, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 13, 2016). 
 83. McArthur, 850 F.3d at 938. 
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all satisfy a single element.84  The statute was, therefore, indivisible under 
Mathis.85 
Because the court found the statute to be indivisible, the court had to de-
termine if the statute, as a whole, comported with the elements of generic bur-
glary laid out in Taylor.86  To do this, the court looked at the two alternatives 
in the Minnesota statute separately and compared those parts to the Taylor el-
ements.87  The first alternative of the Minnesota statute said that burglary is 
unlawfully entering a building with the intent to commit a crime.88  The Eighth 
Circuit determined that this definition contained all the same elements as Tay-
lor.89 
The second alternative in the statute said that burglary is an unlawful en-
try and subsequent commission of a crime while inside the building.90  This 
alternative, however, does not require “intent to commit a crime,” which cre-
ated a question for the court as to whether this construction was broader than 
Taylor.91  The Eighth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that because 
Taylor included “remaining in” a building as part of its definition for generic 
burglary, the Minnesota statute adhered to it.92  According to the government, 
unlawfully entering a building and then later committing a crime meant that 
“[t]he offender necessarily ha[d] ‘remained in’ the building with intent to com-
mit a crime.”93  In the government’s view, intent to commit the crime must 
have formed prior to the crime but at some point while unlawfully “remaining 
in” the building.94 
The Eighth Circuit did not find the government’s argument persuasive.  
The Eighth Circuit believed that the Taylor Court’s reliance on sources such as 
the Model Penal Code showed that the Court envisioned intent at the time of 
unlawful entry.95  “Remaining in,” the court said, was actually meant to cover 
situations where a person had lawfully entered with the intent to later commit 
a crime at a time when he had “overstay[ed] his welcome” and had remained 
in the building unlawfully.96  Furthermore, the court believed that the govern-
ment’s interpretation of remaining in would render the “unlawful entry” ele-
ment of Taylor “superfluous . . . because every unlawful entry . . . would be-
come ‘remaining in’ with intent” at the point of entry.97 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 938–39. 
 88. Id. at 938 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.582(3) (1986)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.582(3)). 
 91. Id. at 939. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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In holding that generic burglary required intent at the moment of unlawful 
entry, the Eighth Circuit vacated Morris’ enhanced sentence under the ACCA 
and remanded his case for resentencing.98  The Eighth Circuit also acknowl-
edged that its decision was in conflict with the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.99 
V. COMMENT 
The Eighth Circuit in McArthur provides the worthier answer in the cir-
cuit battle over when intent must form to count as burglary in § 924(e) of the 
ACCA.  This is because the Eighth Circuit interpretation of burglary is more 
consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor and the 
line of cases following Taylor than are the decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Circuits.  Furthermore, McArthur better promotes consistency and fair-
ness in sentencing – at least as much as the confines of the ACCA will allow. 
Section A of this Part first analyzes why the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
McArthur is superior to that of the other circuits to address the intent issue.  
Section A compares McArthur and competing opinions to Taylor and considers 
the rationale of the United States Supreme Court when it defined burglary for 
the purposes of the ACCA.  Section B of this Part discusses why McArthur also 
satisfies notions of fairness better than the opinions of the other circuits and 
how the ACCA and the Court’s interpretations of it constrict fairness in the 
first instance.  Section B concludes that neither the ACCA nor the Court’s in-
terpretations of it fulfill the ACCA’s statutory goal of consistency and fairness 
in sentencing because serious, violent recidivists are left out of its scheme 
while less culpable offenders are swept into it. 
A. McArthur Best Comports with the Court’s Decision in Taylor 
The Eighth Circuit decision in McArthur is the opinion that most adheres 
to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation in Taylor.  This is true 
whether one looks at the plain language of Taylor’s elements of generic bur-
glary or at the Court’s intent when it crafted them. 
1. The Plain Language of Taylor 
The plain language of Taylor says that generic burglary is “an unlawful 
or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with 
intent to commit a crime.”100  The Eighth Circuit itself only briefly implied that 
its decision in McArthur had a plain language view of Taylor when it stated 
that the “most natural reading” of  Taylor reveals that intent is required either 
 
 98. Id. at 940. 
 99. Id. at 939. 
 100. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). 
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at the unlawful entry or when remaining in a building unlawfully.101  The court 
is not wrong. 
The grammatical structure of Taylor’s generic elements unambiguously 
creates two alternatives by using the coordinating conjunction “or” in-between 
entry and remaining in.  A coordinating conjunction is a grammatical structure 
that joins together independent and equally important clauses.102  Thus, generic 
burglary is both (a) an unlawful or unprivileged entry into a building with the 
intent to commit a crime and (b) an unlawful or unprivileged remaining in a 
building with the intent to commit a crime.  Contrary to the arguments made 
by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits,103 intent is part of Taylor’s “remaining in” 
language.  If intent were not meant to attach to the “remaining in” portion of 
Taylor, the syntax itself would have to have been written differently because 
“remaining in” cannot stand alone as an independent clause – it would be a 
fragment and have no meaning without the rest of the sentence. 
Furthermore, in subsequent cases dealing with generic burglary, the Court 
has strictly construed Taylor to conform with the plain language of the ele-
ments the Court laid out.  For example, when the Court decided Mathis, it de-
termined that Iowa’s burglary statute was broader than generic burglary be-
cause Iowa’s statute provided “vehicle” as an alternative location, while Taylor 
included only a “building or other structure.”104  Mathis is not the first nor the 
only indicator that the Court adheres to a plain language construction of its 
Taylor precedent.  The Court has also implied or explicitly stated that vessels 
and vehicles do not count for the purposes of generic burglary because they are 
not buildings or structures.105 
If the Court plainly construes one portion of the Taylor elements, then 
there is no reason to believe it would not do the same for the rest of the ele-
ments.  Moreover, the Court in Mathis strongly reiterated that in the twenty-
five years since Taylor it had consistently held that applying the ACCA only 
involved comparing elements of the state statute to the elements of generic 
burglary – nothing more.106  This type of rigid comparison lends itself to the 
view that the Court intended the Taylor elements be taken at their face value 
 
 101. McArthur, 850 F.3d at 939. 
 102. A coordinating conjunction is defined as “a conjunction (such as and or or) 
that joins together words or word groups of equal grammatical rank.”  Coordinating 
Conjunction, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/co-
ordinating%20conjunction (last visited Jan. 19, 2018). 
 103. See, e.g., United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 684–85 (6th Cir. 2015), ab-
rogated on other grounds by United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc); United States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188, 192–93 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 104. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2250 (2016); see also Taylor, 495 
U.S. at 598. 
 105. See, e.g., Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 35 (2009) (distinguishing between 
breaking into a vessel and breaking into a building where only the latter satisfies generic 
burglary); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 15–16 (2005) (finding that burglary 
committed on a boat or in a motor vehicle is not generic burglary). 
 106. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257. 
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because otherwise Taylor would have solved nothing in the absence of further 
instructions to lower courts.  The Fourth Circuit was therefore wrong when it 
concluded that a Texas burglary statute, which did not require intent for an 
offender who entered a building and committed a crime,107 was substantially 
the same as Taylor such that it fell within the elements of generic burglary.108  
Because “with intent to commit a crime”109 is plainly attached to both the entry 
and the remaining in portions of Taylor, the absence of intent in the Texas stat-
ute was no minor variation of Taylor, and it is not generic burglary.  The Sixth 
Circuit used the same reasoning when it found that a section of the Tennessee 
burglary statute110 was substantially the same as generic burglary under Taylor 
even though that section had no intent requirement for a person who entered a 
building and committed a crime.111 
2. The United States Supreme Court’s Rationale in Taylor 
Even without the plain language argument, the Eighth Circuit’s holding 
in McArthur – that generic burglary encompasses intent for both unlawful entry 
and unlawful remaining in112 – is still correct when looking at the analysis the 
Taylor Court provided to support its interpretation of burglary for the ACCA.  
Although Taylor looked at legislative intent in enacting the statute,113 the 
Court’s development of the elements of generic burglary relied mainly upon 
the “modern” definition promulgated by LaFave & Scott’s Substantive Crimi-
nal Law treatise.114  Generic burglary, in fact, is explicitly modeled on the 
“contemporary” elements of burglary identified by LaFave & Scott.115  And, 
according to LaFave & Scott, intent is requisite to committing burglary and 
 
 107. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3) (West 2019) (burglary is “en-
ter[ing] a building or habitation and commit[ting] or attempt[ing] to commit a felony, 
theft, or assault”). 
 108. See Bonilla, 687 F.3d at 193 (“[I]n offering guidance to courts as to how to 
apply the definition, Taylor added that ‘where the generic definition has been adopted, 
with minor variations in terminology, then the trial court need find only that the state 
statute corresponds in substance to the generic meaning of burglary.’” (quoting Taylor, 
495 U.S. at 599)). 
 109. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. 
 110. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-14-402(a)(3) (West 2018) (defining burglary as 
“enter[ing] a building and commit[ting] . . . a felony, theft or assault”). 
 111. United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 685 (6th Cir. 2015), abrogated on other 
grounds by United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 112. United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 113. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581–90. 
 114. See id. at 580 n.3, 593, 598. 
 115. Id. (“[M]odern statutes ‘generally require that the entry be unprivileged [and] 
typically describe the place as a ‘building’ or ‘structure’ . . . .  [T]he prevailing view in 
the modern codes is that an intent to commit any offense will do.’” (third alteration in 
original) (quoting W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.13(a), (c), 
(e) (1986)). 
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must be present “while fulfilling the other requirements” of burglary.116  The 
Court’s lengthy look at the congressional record also produced an understand-
ing that Congress’ reason for including burglary as an enumerated “violent fel-
ony” was because a person entering a building with the intent to commit a 
crime was likely to pose a violent threat to the persons inside.117 
Between the Court’s reliance on LaFave & Scott and its finding that Con-
gress named burglary to protect dwellers, it is only reasonable that intent to 
commit a crime is an important part of the ACCA’s definition of burglary.  The 
likelihood for violence is necessarily lower if the offender has no intent to com-
mit a crime when he enters the building because there is no indication that he 
anticipates a confrontation.  Without this distinction, unlawful but otherwise 
physically harmless conduct that Congress was not worried about it when it 
passed the ACCA would be subject to enhanced sentencing.  For example, a 
person could enter a mall during business hours in the winter for the purpose 
of hiding after it closes to stay warm overnight and only later commit a theft of 
opportunity while there.  Surely, someone with a past conviction for a crime of 
this nature on his record does not deserve the same enhanced punishment as 
another whose past conviction included entering the mall with the intent to stay 
after hours for the purpose of robbing an overnight employee at gunpoint. 
Taylor promulgated elements for generic burglary in part as an attempt to 
give effect to Congress’ rationale that intentional burglaries are dangerous.118  
And the Eighth Circuit found that the Taylor Court’s reliance on LaFave & 
Scott signified that the Court had meant for intent at the point of unlawful entry 
or remaining in to exist because that was the same reasoning of the 1986 trea-
tise.119  The Eighth Circuit understood that contemporaneous intent was nec-
essary in conjunction with the unlawful entry or the moment of unlawful re-
maining in, which is why it defined Taylor’s “remaining in” element as “a dis-
crete event that occurs at the moment when a perpetrator, who at one point was 
lawfully present, exceeds his license and overstays his welcome.”120  Without 
intent at the discrete moment, the court continued, there was no generic bur-
glary.121 
 
 116. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 21.1(e), Westlaw (data-
base updated Oct. 2018) (“[A]t common law, one must have intended to commit a fel-
ony while fulfilling the other requirements [of burglary].  If the actor when he was 
breaking and entering only intended to commit a simple trespass, he was not guilty of 
burglary [even if] he in fact committed a felony after entering.”).  The treatise also finds 
that although most states have expanded the type of crime required as an element (e.g., 
not just felonies), very few have eliminated intent.  Id. 
 117. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588 (“Congress singled out burglary . . . because of its 
inherent potential for harm to persons. The fact that an offender enters a building to 
commit a crime often creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between the of-
fender and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes to investigate.”). 
 118. See id. 
 119. United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 939 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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In contrast, the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that Taylor 
meant to distinguish between levels of risk by requiring intent to commit a 
crime to be the basis for an unlawful entry or remaining in.122  In Bonilla  ¸the 
Fourth Circuit declared that the Texas “remaining in” variant of burglary was 
within Taylor’s elements even without an explicit reference to intent because 
anyone who committed a crime while in the building “necessarily” formed in-
tent prior to acting.123  Likewise, when describing “remaining in” burglaries, 
the Sixth Circuit adopted the “necessarily” formed language regarding in-
tent.124  Neither circuit, however, offered any explanation as to why Taylor 
would explicitly invoke congressional purpose but not implement its finding 
that Congress enacted the statutory language including burglary in an attempt 
to protect potential victims from the high risk imposed by premeditated bur-
glary.125 
Under this faulty assumption, a legally defined burglary would occur re-
gardless of whether the perpetrator set out to commit a crime other than tres-
pass and without regard to whether the subsequent crime posed the level of 
danger Congress intended when it passed the ACCA.  For example, juvenile 
offenses can be considered when the court is determining whether an offender 
has the prerequisite amount of prior offenses for enhanced sentencing.126  Thus, 
any school kid entering a condemned building on a dare only to then take some-
thing found therein would be guilty of burglary and, perhaps, later in life, sen-
tenced harshly under the ACCA because of a misguided and technically illegal 
stunt.  Subsequently, the Fourth and Sixth Circuit reasoning is not in line with 
Taylor because Taylor formed the elements of generic burglary in light of Con-
gress’ goal of protecting the public from violent recidivists.127  The Eighth Cir-
cuit in McArthur was right to give weight to the legislative intent of the ACCA 
as found by the United States Supreme Court in Taylor when the Eighth Circuit 
held that Taylor requires intent to commit a subsequent crime at the point of 
unlawful entry or remaining in. 
B. McArthur’s Interpretation Produces Fairer Results 
The McArthur decision produces results more consistent with the notion 
of fairness than does the decisions by the Fourth or Sixth Circuit because it 
limits who is eligible to receive enhanced sentences.  The Taylor Court found 
 
 122. Id. at 194. 
 123. United States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 124. United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 685 (6th Cir. 2015), abrogated on other 
grounds by United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 125. Only the dissent in Bonilla even bothers to discuss the treatise and the Model 
Penal Code cited by the United States Supreme Court when it decided Taylor.  Bonilla, 
687 F.3d at 198 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting). 
 126. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(C) (2018) (stating for the purposes of enhanced sen-
tencing, a prior conviction also includes “juvenile delinquency involving a violent fel-
ony”).  A violent felony includes burglary.  Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 127. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 587–90 (1990). 
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that Congress intended this provision of the ACCA to protect the public from 
violent recidivists because intentional burglaries were at high risk for violent 
confrontations.128  Thus the fairness argument is two-fold: first, it is fairer be-
cause offenders who do not pose the same risk for violence as someone com-
mitting a premeditated crime are not going to be subject to enhanced sentenc-
ing; and second, it is fairer because it further provides consistency across state 
lines by imposing the same standards regardless of where the prior crimes were 
committed. 
1. The Fairer Results of McArthur 
If it is accepted that both Congress and the Taylor Court respectively 
passed and interpreted the burglary provision of the ACCA as they did because 
they viewed violent recidivists as more deserving of harsh punishments, then 
it is fair to extrapolate that enhanced sentencing provisions must be applied 
only to those offenders and not to anyone of lesser culpability.  For this reason, 
the McArthur interpretation of the intent element produces a fairer result be-
cause its interpretation is more likely to exclude less violent crimes from pred-
icating a long prison term than are the interpretations of the Fourth and Sixth 
Circuits. 
And as a practical matter, the Eighth Circuit in McArthur, by limiting 
burglary under the ACCA, ensured that Morris would not be sentenced to more 
than ten years for his crime as a felon in possession of a weapon.129  While 
likely no one would argue that Morris, who was also convicted for attempted 
murder,130 should be roaming the streets, that does not change the fact that his 
prior crimes did not make him eligible for enhanced sentencing under the 
ACCA.  The ACCA only allows prior offenses to trigger an enhanced punish-
ment if the prior convictions were violent.131  Given that Morris was originally 
sentenced to an enhanced punishment of thirty years for merely possessing a 
weapon, and not for using it, as a prior criminal,132 the difference of twenty 
years is staggering.  The fact that Morris also only received an additional com-
bined total of five years for his other three convictions in the same trial, which 
included attempted murder – in other words the actual usage of the firearm133 
– shows just how grave an enhanced ACCA possession conviction is.  The 
clearly disproportionate sentences for two crimes of vastly differing severity – 
mere possession of a firearm versus attempted murder – demonstrate why it is 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (setting a maximum of ten years for the unenhanced 
version of felon in possession of a weapon). 
 130. Special Verdict Form, supra note 23, at 3. 
 131. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (the only offenders eligible for enhanced sentencing are 
those with “previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug 
offense”). 
 132. United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 937 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 133. Id. at 933. 
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extremely important to ensure that the underlying crimes supporting an en-
hanced conviction truly be violent. 
Further, consider that under the definitions of the Fourth and Sixth Cir-
cuits, it is entirely possible that two offenders with markedly different criminal 
histories will receive a similar enhanced sentence for the crime of gun posses-
sion even if one offender is clearly far more dangerous and thus, theoretically, 
far more deserving than the other.  There is nothing fair about an offender with 
a penchant for petty opportunistic theft receiving the same thirty-year sentence 
for gun possession as an offender with a history of committing premeditated 
assaults.  McArthur’s interpretation, therefore, is more likely to ensure that only 
violent or potentially violent burglaries qualify for enhanced sentencing by lim-
iting the prior burglaries to those committed with intent. 
In addition to at least fairly punishing only prior violent offenders, the 
McArthur decision also keeps the government honest by not allowing it to rely 
on gun possession as a proxy to punish for relatively worse crimes, such as 
Morris’ attempted murder.  This result is consistent with the United States Su-
preme Court’s unwillingness to deviate from precedence set by Taylor or its 
progeny, even when holding steadfast has meant that clearly dangerous repeat 
offenders, who are the targets of the ACCA enhanced sentencing, would not 
spend the time they arguably deserved behind bars.  Mathis is the perfect ex-
ample of this. 
The home of Richard Mathis, the defendant, was searched pursuant to a 
warrant because he had lured a fifteen-year-old boy to his home through an 
internet website and then sexually molested him.134  Investigations also re-
vealed that the boy was not Mathis’ first victim and that Mathis had coerced 
other males, who were juveniles or in their early twenties, into sexual con-
tact.135  Despite this, the prosecutors chose not to charge Mathis with child sex 
offenses and, instead, charged him solely for possession of a .22 caliber rifle 
that deputies found during the search of his home.136 
Assuming, as the evidence suggests, that the multiple allegations of child 
sexual abuse against Mathis are true, he is surely the exact type of repeat of-
fender that Congress had in mind when it provided for enhanced sentencing of 
violent recidivists under the ACCA.  Yet, no matter how heinous these crimes 
are, an enhanced sentence for a gun crime under the ACCA cannot be a substi-
tute for appropriately charging and prosecuting those offenses.  When the Court 
struck down Mathis’ sentence under the ACCA, it did so because the prior 
criminal convictions Mathis actually had under the Iowa state burglary statute 
were not found to be generic burglaries under Taylor.137  The end result is that 
 
 134. Appellant’s Brief at 2, Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (No. 
14-2396), 2014 WL 4271867. 
 135. Id. at 4–6. 
 136. Id. at 2. 
 137. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251. 
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Mathis’ fifteen-year sentence under the ACCA was vacated and remanded for 
resentencing.138 
Similarly, McArthur follows the Court’s precedent because it also limits 
how much the government can rely on prior convictions to impose long prison 
terms for gun possession in that only certain burglaries will quality for en-
hancement.139  This means that a defendant’s right to trial for serious crimes 
he may have committed, such as the alleged crimes of Mathis, will not be in-
fringed upon as much as it otherwise might be.  Conversely, the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Bonilla meant that an unauthorized immigrant who was con-
victed of illegal reentry and who had a prior burglary conviction was subjected 
to an enhanced sentence, albeit under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.140  
The statute under which Bonilla was convicted did not mandate intent as an 
element, and so the defendant argued that such a definition was inconsistent 
with generic burglary under Taylor.141  The Fourth Circuit found that intent 
was not required because it would necessarily form when an offender remained 
in a building.142  This decision meant that Bonilla would be treated the same, 
for enhancement purposes, as someone who had committed a premeditated 
burglary – the sort of crime that Congress believed made the offense of bur-
glary dangerous in the first place.143 
Such a result is not as fair or as consistent with Taylor as is the result 
achieved by the McArthur decision.  If Bonilla had been decided by the Eighth 
Circuit, the defendant would not have been eligible for enhanced sentencing 
because the lack of intent is fatal and not in-line with the Court’s reasoning for 
defining generic burglary in the way that it did. 
In sum, the McArthur decision requiring intent at the outset promotes fair-
ness by ensuring that enhanced sentencing can only be imposed for prior of-
fenses that Congress envisioned as likely to include violence.  The decision 
also serves as a limited check on the laziness or weakness of the prosecution 
by forcing the government to properly charge defendants with crimes they have 
actually committed instead of relying on an easy-to-prove gun possession 
charge as a way to send defendants to prison for long periods of time without 
pursing the serious offenses. 
2. Neither the Armed Criminal Career Act nor the Taylor Interpreta-
tion Can Justly Punish 
As fair as the outcome in McArthur was, the decision was necessarily 
constrained only to attempting to make the application of the statute fair.  En-
 
 138. United States v. Mathis, 832 F.3d 876, 876 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 139. See United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 938–40 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 140. United States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188, 190 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 141. Id. at 189–90. 
 142. Id. at 194. 
 143. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588 (1990). 
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hanced punishments, whether under the ACCA or under the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, are inherently questionable because they punish based on prior 
convictions and not strictly the crime at hand.  In other words, the punishment 
does not fit the crime because the offender is partly sentenced for his past be-
havior.  There are several theories for why criminal justice systems tend to 
punish recidivists more harshly than other offenders.  The most pervasive is 
the idea that repeated lawbreakers deserve less leniency than a first-time of-
fender because the first-time offender is entitled to a lesser punishment based 
on his otherwise good character while the repeat transgressor has already ex-
tinguished his chance.144  But punishing based on prior offenses is problematic 
in a plethora of situations.  For example, someone who may have been con-
victed of several crimes as a young person goes on to live a crime-free life for 
twenty years before getting caught with a hunting rifle would be sentenced to 
thirty years for gun possession even though the prior crimes are no longer in-
dicative of the character of that person and the crime at hand is not violent. 
Even if, as a society, we value the retributive aspect of punishing gener-
ally for repeated offenses, the blanket, one-size fits all solution of mandatory 
enhanced sentences is troubling.  The ACCA is both too narrow because it does 
not include all prior violent offenders and too broad because it does not 
properly exclude less culpable people.  Furthermore, the ACCA targets gun 
possession, and not the violent use of a gun, for enhanced sentencing.145  Ret-
ribution, or the idea that a criminal should get what he deserves, holds consid-
erable sway in criminal law.146  Yet, despite this, the United States relies heav-
ily on prior offenses to determine the sentencing outcomes of current of-
fenses.147  If retribution is the goal of punishment, then the punishment should 
be proportional to the actual crime committed, regardless of whether the of-
fender is a repeat player or a first-timer. 
The problem with the ACCA is deeper than just a fairness issue.  The fact 
that it has been a repeated source of litigation for over twenty-five years148 
suggests that it has serious deficiencies.149  In 2015, the Court signaled a will-
 
 144. Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime – Not the Prior Convic-
tions of the Person that Committed the Crime: An Argument for less Impact Being Ac-
corded to Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 369–70 
(2014). 
 145. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2018). 
 146. See, e.g., Bagaric, supra note 144, at 367–77 (discussing retribution as an at-
tractive reason for punishing crime generally and recidivists in particular). 
 147. See id. at 352–53. 
 148. See e.g., Stokeling v. United States¸139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (holding the term 
“physical force” as used in the ACCA includes any force, however slight, necessary to 
overcome the victim’s resistance); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); 
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525 
(9th Cir. 1989), abrogated by Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575.  
 149. Sheldon A. Evans, Punishing Criminals for Their Conduct: A Return to Rea-
son for the Armed Criminal Career Act, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 623, 676–78 (2018). 
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ingness to revisit the legality of the ACCA when it overruled its own prece-
dence by holding in Johnson v. United States that the “residual clause” of § 
924(e) was unconstitutional for vagueness.150  The “residual clause” clause al-
lowed courts to impose enhanced sentences for any crime that the court deemed 
involved violent conduct, but the clause did not provide any guidance to courts 
in making that determination.151  Some of the justices have repeatedly ex-
pressed frustration with a lack of congressional action to fix the problems with 
the ACCA,152 which might finally push the Court into holding the ACCA un-
constitutional.  Likewise, the late Senator Arlen Spector, author of the ACCA, 
found the Court’s approach to defining and applying the ACCA unwieldy.153 
There is also a legitimate question as to whether Taylor itself fully effec-
tuates Congress’ goals because, for example, the element of generic burglary 
limits entry to only buildings or structures, which does not fully protect the 
public from violent confrontations with burglars.  For example, a King County 
judge in Seattle, Washington, recently ruled that a homeless man’s truck was 
his home and therefore could not be sold by the city in order to recoup parking 
fines the man had incurred.154  Thus, a burglary that occurs in a vehicle serving 
as a home is similar to a burglary occurring in a traditional home because the 
likelihood for confrontation is high.  Prior to its decision in United States v. 
Stitt,155 the United States Supreme Court had definitively stated that vehicles 
did not count for the purposes of the ACCA.156  Excluding burglaries that occur 
in vehicles and other places where people often sleep, such as tents, arguably 
does not account for the type of violent encounters Congress envisioned when 
it included burglary in the enumerated offenses of the ACCA.  But in Stitt, 
decided in December 2018, the Court recognized this when it found that bur-
glary of structures or vehicles adapted for overnight accommodation, even if 
that accommodation is only part-time, is burglary for the purposes of the 
ACCA.157  Notably, however, the Court remanded to Arkansas state courts the 
 
 150. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. 
 151. Id. at 2257–59; see also Evans, supra note 149, at 677–78 (providing a more 
in-depth discussion of the residual clause). 
 152. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2258 (2016) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (pointing out that parts of the Court’s statutory interpretations of the ACCA 
are arbitrary but that continued inaction by Congress requires the Court to revisit its 
precedence on the matter). 
 153. 156 CONG. REC. S10, 516–17 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Specter). 
 154. Vianna Davila, Judge Rules Seattle Homeless Man’s Truck Is a Home, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/home-
less/judge-rules-seattle-homeless-mans-truck-is-a-home/. 
 155. This case is a consolidation of two lower court decisions: United States v. Sims 
from the Eighth Circuit and United States v. Stitt from the Sixth Circuit.  139 S. Ct. 399 
(2018). 
 156. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 15–16 (2005) (finding that burglary 
committed in a motor vehicle is not generic burglary). 
 157. United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 404–05 (2018). 
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respondent’s assertion that Arkansas’ state burglary statute is too broad be-
cause it could cover a vehicle “in which a homeless person occasionally 
sleeps.”158 
The solution, therefore, to both fixing the problems with the ACCA and 
effectuating Congress’ goal to punish violent offenders is to rethink the way 
sentencing is approached.  Ideally, Congress itself would revisit the ACCA and 
amend or replace it with clearer guidelines.  At the very least, rather than stat-
utorily impose sentences based in part on the criminal history of the offender, 
Congress should instead free the courts to punish the individual based on the 
facts of the particular crime for which he is being sentenced. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The ACCA and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were imposed because 
the legislature was trying to fix what it perceived as wildly unfair sentencing 
practices.  The congressional goal of promoting fairness by providing uni-
formity is easily undermined by the arbitrary application of the ACCA when 
prosecutors and courts insist on pushing state criminal statutes to their outer-
most limits in order to capture as many prior offenses as possible. 
Although there is no indication that the United States Supreme Court in-
tends to resolve the circuit split over the intent element of generic burglary, 
when the Court eventually does, it should choose to embrace the position put 
forth by the Eighth Circuit in McArthur.  The Eighth Circuit articulated sound 
reasoning that is in line with the Court’s Taylor rationale and better promotes 
both the intent of Congress in passing the ACCA and the notion of fairness in 
sentencing by limiting which prior burglaries count for mandatory enhanced 
punishment.  In the alternative, the Court should expand its own lead in John-




 158. Id. at 407. 
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